

NSC BRIEFING

REF. TO

21 December 1954

SOVIET REACTIONS TO GERMAN REARMAMENT

I. Prime goal of Soviet foreign policy is to prevent agreement on West German rearmament:

A. Here Soviet face loss of first round.

B. This loss could force Soviet re-examination "soft" policy - might lead to more vigorous action to "face" by failure to achieve rearmament.

C. Hence, in period ahead, increased vigilance required.

D. Soviet realize ratification of rearmament that will be 2-3 years before ratification and any substantial German military force in being.

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B. Timing of Soviet action will depend upon their judgment as to course which will both maintain their prestige and prevent ultimate German rearmament within NATO Alliance.

I. In attempt prevent ratification Paris Agreements, Moscow has made series public threats:

A. To strengthen Soviet Bloc's own war machine (this may be effected propaganda-wise by budget-juggling).

B. To continue indefinitely division of Germany, occupation of Austria.


C. To scrap both Franco-Soviet and Anglo-Soviet treaties (military assistance against German aggression).

Get Troops out of Tyrol
D. To refuse further negotiation with West.

III. These out-in-open steps have been coupled with vigorous private pressure.

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A. Direct private pressure on French and Austrian ambassadors; soft words to Yugoslavs, Indonesians, Burmese, others.



IV. Possible Soviet will make moves after ratification in order show they not bluffing and to alert waverers (particularly in France and Germany) to consequences German rearmament. Such moves

- A. Restrict border crossings between West and East Zone Germany and between Western and Eastern sectors Berlin.
- B. Put pressure on Austria (note AM press).
- C. Possible Communist attempts foment political strikes in France.
- D. Break off disarmament negotiations.
- E. Renew propaganda attack on US "atomic invasion of Europe".
- F. Increase pressures on Finland.
- G. Increase Soviet support for Finland.

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C. On active side, can expect:

1. continued harassment offshore islands;
2. increased aid to Viet Minh.

D. In contrast this "tough" line, Bloc will
continue cultivation of Japan, India, Burma,
Indonesia.

VII. All in all, this time to be ready for surprises

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B. Reunification Germany plus free elections,
without prior withdrawal occupation forces.

C. In exchange, abandonment German rearmament
(Germany allowed only border guards and po-
lice force and forbidden to join any military
or economic bloc prior 1999).

D. Establishment all-European security system,
including USA, with guarantee of neutralized

VI. Even if Soviet continues to support

nevertheless back Peiping's "tough" line in Asia
aimed first at US, second at UK.

A. This indicated by Krompholtz support of Chicoma
re Formosa.

B. Can also expect propaganda exploitation of
Hammaraskjold Peiping mission, including:

1. Piracy charges;
2. Inquiry on UN dispatch of POW's from
Korean war.